You are confusing my apparent misconstrual with disagreement. I haven’t misinterpreted the eternal God of classical theism as temporal. I disagree with the assumption that the eternal God of classical theism is atemporal. The same applies to my other supposed misinterpretations of time, freedom, and the motive for Creation.
Concerning the post to which Kristor responded, I added:
My post demonstrates how the assumptions and assertions of classical theism become incoherent when the framework for said assumptions is removed. For example, an atemporal God becomes incoherent if one assumes the reality of time, which I do. God as the exclusive first cause becomes incoherent if God is not the exclusive first cause, and so forth.
Kristor, in turn, vehemently protested the approach I had taken:
You can’t talk about before and after in the life of the eternal God of classical theism, and argue from the absurdities that result from so doing, without implicitly presupposing that the eternal God of classical theism is temporal.
And to do that is to suppose that he is not the God of classical theism to begin with, but rather a god like Thor.
If there is before and after in the life of God, so that he could enjoy his perfection before he created (thus raising the question of why he created a world utterly superfluous to his perfect enjoyment) then he is temporal … and he is not the God that the classical theists are talking about, but a straw man and a misdirection and a confusion.
You can’t have it both ways. If you want to debunk the eternal God of classical theism, you’ll have to dispense with all the talk of before and after, and talk about the God of classical theism.
Kristor has raised a crucial point when it comes to discussing metaphysics. So, let’s take a moment and apply the same point to him:
You can’t talk about the non-omni qualities of the God of Romantic Christianity (for lack of a better way of putting it) and argue from the absurdities that result from so doing, without implicitly presupposing the God of Romantic Christianity is omni-everything and atemporal.
And to do that is to suppose that he is not the God of Romantic Christianity to begin with, but rather a god like the omni-everything, absolute God of classical theism.
If the Romantic Christian God is omni, atemporal, and a Trinity, then that God is omni-everything…and that God is not the God that Romantic Christians are talking about, but a straw man and a misdirection and a confusion.
You can’t have it both ways. If you want to debunk the non-omni God of Romantic Christianity, you’ll have to dispense with all the talk of omni, ex nihilo, absolute, and atemporal, and talk about the God of Romantic Christianity.
I bring this up because I want to make Kristor acutely aware of something he seems oblivious to.
He consistently exempts himself from the considerations he insists upon above, particularly when debunking the concept of God I or Dr. Charlton put forward. And when I say consistently, I mean for more than a decade in Bruce’s case.
Kristor expects me to debunk his concept of God solely on his terms while enjoying the privilege of not having to do the same when he debunks my concept of God.
Put another way, if I want to debunk the God of classical theism, I must do it within the parameters of classical theism.
Kristor, on the other hand, reserves the right to debunk the Romantic Christian God within the parameters of, you guessed it, classical theism.
I don’t know about you, but that seems like having it both ways. It also helps illuminate why our discussions about metaphysics never go anywhere.
You can’t have it both ways. Kristor is right, and I wholeheartedly agree with him.
On that note, it would be great to see him apply that criterion to himself more vigorously and rigorously when discussing metaphysics.